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The fact that individuals will most likely behave differently in differentsituations begets the introduction of conditional strategies. Inspired by this,we study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, wherebesides unconditional cooperators and defectors, also different types ofconditional cooperators compete for space. Conditional cooperators willcontribute to the public good only if other players within the group are likelyto cooperate as well, but will withhold their contribution otherwise. Dependingon the number of other cooperators that are required to elicit cooperation of aconditional cooperator, the latter can be classified in as many types as thereare players within each group. We find that the most cautious cooperators, suchthat require all other players within a group to be conditional cooperators,are the undisputed victors of the evolutionary process, even at very lowsynergy factors. We show that the remarkable promotion of cooperation is dueprimarily to the spontaneous emergence of quarantining of defectors, whichbecome surrounded by conditional cooperators and are forced into isolatedconvex "bubbles" from where they are unable to exploit the public good. Thisphenomenon can be observed only in structured populations, thus adding to therelevance of pattern formation for the successful evolution of cooperation.

Conditional strategies and the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games