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We propose an efficient strategy to attack a continuous-variable quantum keydistribution (CV-QKD) system, that we call homodyne detector blinding. Thisattack strategy takes advantage of a generic vulnerability of homodynereceivers: a bright light pulse sent on the signal port can lead to asaturation of the detector electronics. While detector saturation has alreadybeen proposed to attack CV-QKD, the attack we study in this paper has theadditional advantage of not requiring an eavesdropper to be phase locked withthe homodyne receiver. We show that under certain conditions, an attacker canuse a simple laser, incoherent with the homodyne receiver, to generate brightpulses and bias the excess noise to arbitrary small values, fully comprisingCV-QKD security. These results highlight the feasibility and the impact of thedetector blinding attack. We finally discuss how to design countermeasures inorder to protect against this attack.

Homodyne-detector-blinding attack in continuous-variable quantum key distribution