English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

The security of quantum communication using a weak coherent source requiresan accurate knowledge of the source's mean photon number. Finite calibrationprecision or an active manipulation by an attacker may cause the actual emittedphoton number to deviate from the known value. We model effects of thisdeviation on the security of three quantum communication protocols: theBennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol withoutdecoy states, Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) QKD protocol, and acoin-tossing protocol. For QKD, we model both a strong attack using technologypossible in principle, and a realistic attack bounded by today's technology. Tomaintain the mean photon number in two-way systems, such as plug-and-play andrelativistic quantum cryptography schemes, bright pulse energy incoming fromthe communication channel must be monitored. Implementation of a monitoringdetector has largely been ignored so far, except for ID Quantique's commercialQKD system Clavis2. We scrutinize this implementation for security problems,and show that designing a hack-proof pulse-energy-measuring detector is farfrom trivial. Indeed the first implementation has three serious flaws confirmedexperimentally, each of which may be exploited in a cleverly constructedTrojan-horse attack. We discuss requirements for a loophole-free implementationof the monitoring detector.

Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing