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We define the task of {\it quantum tagging}, that is, authenticating theclassical location of a classical tagging device by sending and receivingquantum signals from suitably located distant sites, in an environmentcontrolled by an adversary whose quantum information processing andtransmitting power is unbounded. We define simple security models for this taskand briefly discuss alternatives.  We illustrate the pitfalls of naive quantum cryptographic reasoning in thiscontext by describing several protocols which at first sight appearunconditionally secure but which, as we show, can in fact be broken byteleportation-based attacks. We also describe some protocols which cannot bebroken by these specific attacks, but do not prove they are unconditionallysecure.  We review the history of quantum tagging protocols, which we first discussedin 2002 and described in a 2006 patent (for an insecure protocol). Thepossibility has recently been reconsidered by other authors. All the morerecently discussed protocols of which we are aware were either previouslyconsidered by us in 2002-3 or are variants of schemes then considered, and allare provably insecure.

Quantum Tagging: Authenticating Location via Quantum Information and Relativistic Signalling Constraints