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Implementation of high-speed quantum key distribution~(QKD) has become one ofthe major focus in the field, which produces high key-generation rate forapplications. To achieve high-speed QKD, tailored techniques are developed andemployed to quickly generate and detect quantum states. However, thesetechniques may introduce unique loopholes to compromise the security of QKDsystems. In this paper, we investigate the loopholes of self-differencing~(SD)avalanche photodiode~(APD) detector, typically used for high-speed detection ina QKD system, and demonstrate experimental testing of SD APD detector understrong pulse illumination attack. This attack presents blinding stability andhelps an eavesdropper to learn the secret key without introducing extra QBER.Based on this testing, we propose a set of criteria for protecting SD APDdetectors from the strong pulse illumination attack.

Strong pulse illumination hacks self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in a high-speed quantum key distribution system