Particularism around the World

This article presents a new data set on electoral systems and outlines its potential uses in research on the links between electoral systems and economic outcomes. The data measure the extent to which politicians can advance their careers by appealing to narrow geographic constituencies on the one hand or party constituencies on the other. Electoral systems have long been viewed as mechanisms that enforce politicians' accountability. There has been less systematic focus, however, on differences in the entities to whom these elected representatives are accountable. The data set outlined in this article begins to quantify the varying incentives that electoral systems around the world create. In particular, the variables in the data set indi- cate the extent to which the electoral process creates incentives for politicians to cater to narrow constituencies. The data set is useful for several areas of political economy. Differences in the effective arbiters of policymakers' careers may influence how different interest groups can affect policymaking. In systems where politicians' careers are deter- mined by the wills (and whims) of their constituencies, interest groups must channel their demands through district-level politics. In systems where candi- dates' futures are determined by party favors, interest groups may gain more influence by appealing to the party leaders who oversee politicians. The ways in which politicians further their careers are also likely to influence their policymaking priorities. For example, the strength of their connections to