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Usual measures of the risk-taking incentives of bank CEOs do not capture the risk-shifting incentives that the exposure of a CEO’s wealth to his rm’s stock price (delta) creates in highly levered rms. We nd evidence consistent with the importance of these incentives for bank CEOs: In a sample of large U.S. nancial rms, a higher pre-crisis delta is associated with a signicantly higher probability of failure during the 2007–2010 nancial crisis in highly levered rms, but not in less levered rms

Leverage, CEO Risk-Taking Incentives, and Bank Failure during the 2007–10 Financial Crisis*