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In Chester v Afshar [2004], the House of Lords stated they were departing from the traditional rules of causation in order to vindicate the patient's right of autonomy. Subsequent judgments in the Court of Appeal expressed concerns over the lack of clarity of the legal principles to be derived from that judgment. In Correia v University Hospital of North Staffordshire NHS Trust [2017] and Diamond v Royal Devon and Exeter NHS Foundation Trust [2019], however, the Court of Appeal sought to clarify the scope and limits of Chester. This commentary sets out the scope and limits of Chester in light of those judgments and considers the extent to which they can be said to be vindicating patient autonomy. Drawing upon Coggon's typology of autonomy, it concludes that future judgments should utilise that typology to explicate which understanding of autonomy they are seeking to protect.

Correia, Diamond and the Chester Exception: Vindicating Patient Autonomy?