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Response to comments on HABER, L. AND HABER, R. N. (2007) ‘Scientific validation of fingerprint evidence under Daubert’. Law, Probability and Risk. We gratefully acknowledge the astute articles by Christophe Champod (2007), Simon Cole (2007) and Jennifer Mnookin (2007) in response to our paper ‘Scientific validation of fingerprint evidence under Daubert’ (Haber & Haber, 2007). Their commentaries reveal a fundamental paradox faced by the fingerprint profession. The three commentators concur with us that the validity of ACE-V has yet to be demonstrated. Cole (1999, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) in particular has expressed this concern repeatedly. Cole is very pessimistic and thinks we are banging our scientific heads against a judicial wall that is thus far unwilling to consider validity with respect to fingerprints as a criterion under Daubert. He supports our experimental approach, but holds out little hope that the fingerprint profession will ever accept it. Mnookin and Champod, for different reasons, are unhappy about our intense focus on the validity of the ACE-V method, and they propose different alternative approaches to making fingerprint testimony acceptable to the courts. Mnookin’s (2007) alternative is the more dramatic. She suggests that examiners change the basis of their conclusion from a scientifically documented method to the one based on their individual training and experience: that the examiner testifies as an experiential expert. If followed, this approach would have far-reaching consequences for the way in which fingerprint testimony is offered in court today. Champod’s (2007) solution is more narrowly focused. Instead of testifying with 100% certainty, examiners should offer probabilistic conclusions based in part on the outcome of statistical modelling that shows the probability of feature co-occurrences between two different fingers. This suggestion does not directly address the absence of validity problem presently plaguing ACE-V, but does serve to maintain the examiner’s present position as a scientific expert. Champod has advanced this argument in several contexts in previous publications, and we welcome a chance to include it in our concerns about validity here. We consider the following two alternatives first.

Experiential or scientific expertise