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An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and adefeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way toevaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is theproblem of aggregating the opinions of multiple agents on how a given set ofarguments should be evaluated. It is crucial not only to ensure that theoutcome is logically consistent, but also satisfies measures of socialoptimality and immunity to strategic manipulation. This is because agents havetheir individual preferences about what the outcome ought to be. In the currentpaper, we analyze three previously introduced argument-based aggregationoperators with respect to Pareto optimality and strategy proofness underdifferent general classes of agent preferences. We highlight fundamentaltrade-offs between strategic manipulability and social optimality on one hand,and classical logical criteria on the other. Our results motivate furtherinvestigation into the relationship between social choice and argumentationtheory. The results are also relevant for choosing an appropriate aggregationoperator given the criteria that are considered more important, as well as thenature of agents' preferences.

Pareto Optimality and Strategy Proofness in Group Argument Evaluation (Extended Version)