Neuroscience or neurospeculation? Peer commentary on four articles examining the prevalence of neuroscience in criminal cases around the world

There is a certain allure to neuroscience. It is easy to understand why a field that seeks to understand the intricacies of the humanmind has such wide appeal.Thewidespread use of neuroas the ‘prefix du jour’ would suggest that there is also a general belief that neuroscientific approaches to old problems hold the promise of new answers. The lawhas not been exempt from this promise.Quite the opposite, the potential for neuroscience to provide new answers to the legal problems has generated substantial andwidespread excitement.This is evident in the sharp rise in conceptual and empirical scholarship on the subject, the proliferation of national and international conferences, and the investment of tens of millions of dollars by public and private entities fueling interdisciplinary research to develop this field.1 This collective excitement is easy to understand. As long as there have been laws, fact-finders have struggled to answer critical questions when applying those laws to individual cases. In a previous article summarizing thefieldof neuroscience and law, I provided some examples:Was the defendant responsible?What did the defendant intend? How competent is the individual to stand trial? Is this witness lying?What capacity did the defendant have to act differently? And will the person be a repeat offender?2 The accurate adjudication of each of these questions is essential for the just application of