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Some philosophers maintain that consciousness poses a problem for attempts to articulate a naturalistic account of mental phenomena. These philosophers often maintain that there are two different kinds of consciousness. There is, on the one hand, the kind of consciousness that factors into descriptions and explanations of behavior—what Ned Block has called 'access consciousness', and there is, on the other hand, the kind of consciousness that consists of qualitative feels or qualia—what Block has called 'phenomenal consciousness'. Many philosophers feel confident that access-conscious states can be understood in terms of the functional roles they play in explanations of behavior, and that the mechanisms occupying these roles can be understood in principle in completely naturalistic terms. But, they claim, phenomenal consciousness is different. It cannot be given a functional-role analysis, so it presents an obstacle to a naturalistic theory of mind. Philosophers like Dimitris Platchias disagree. Consciousness, they say, can be understood in terms of a functional role. To appreciate their view, we first have to reject the idea that there are two kinds of consciousness. There is only one, say philosophers like Platchias; it's the kind of phenomenon Thomas Nagel has described: there is something it is like for us to be in conscious mental states. There are nevertheless many mental states that are not conscious. Freud made known examples of unconscious desires and other cognitive states, but there are examples of unconscious perceptual or sensory states as well. A hiker moving quickly through the woods avoids a large tree branch that has fallen across the path. Avoiding the branch requires the hiker to have fairly detailed sensory information about it, but the hiker may not be conscious of all its sensory features. Likewise, patients with neurological conditions like blindsight perceive qualitative features of their

Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain * By DIMITRIS PLATCHIAS