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We study the asymptotic macroscopic properties of the mixed majority-minoritygame, modeling a population in which two types of heterogeneous adaptiveagents, namely ``fundamentalists'' driven by differentiation and``trend-followers'' driven by imitation, interact. The presence of a fraction fof trend-followers is shown to induce (a) a significant loss of informationalefficiency with respect to a pure minority game (in particular, an efficient,unpredictable phase exists only for f<1/2), and (b) a catastrophic increase ofglobal fluctuations for f>1/2. We solve the model by means of an approximatestatic (replica) theory and by a direct dynamical (generating functional)technique. The two approaches coincide and match numerical resultsconvincingly.Comment: 19 pages, 3 figure

Statistical mechanics of the mixed majority–minority game with random external information