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Experimental realism aims at striking a middle ground between scientific realism and anti- realism, between the success of experimental physics it would explain and the realism about scientific theories it would supplant. This middle ground reinstates the engineering idea that belief in scientific entities is justified on purely experimental grounds, without any com- mitment to scientific theories and laws. This paper argues that there is no defensible middle ground to be staked out when it comes to justifying physicists' belief in colored quarks, and that experimental realism shifts, under analysis, into scientific realism. 1. Introduction. Entity realism emerged at the beginning of the 1980s as a refreshingly new position in the philosophical stand-off between scientific realism and anti-realism. The publication of Bas van Fraassen's book The Scientific Image (1980) issued an empiricist challenge to the traditional realist view. From an empiricist viewpoint, belief in the truth of scientific theories seemed a gratuitous addition to the more modest belief in the empirical adequacy of the theory. And by dispensing with the full truth of scientific theories, the truth of the theoretical claims about unobservable scientific entities was dispensed with altogether. The novelty of entity realism consisted precisely in addressing van Fraassen's challenge without falling back on scientific realism. Among the varieties of entity realism, Ian Hacking's experimental realism occupies an

Non-defensible Middle Ground for Experimental Realism: Why We Are Justified to Believe in Colored Quarks