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Party-system dynamics and party EU ideology have traditionally influenced trends in EU issue-voting, with opposition and Eurosceptic parties being more likely to benefit electorally from EU issues. While the electoral benefits of Eurosceptic and opposition parties on the EU have been separately analysed, less is known about the persistence of these preference configurations when Eurosceptic parties move into government. This raises a key question: Does the electoral potential of Eurosceptic parties change once they take over government? We address this question focusing on the Italian case, which, due to the experience of having had a fully-fledged Eurosceptic cabinet in the 2018–2019 period, allows us to test whether changes in governing/opposition status affect the electoral performance of Eurosceptic/Europhile parties on EU issues. While confirming that Italian voters are likely, electorally, to reward opposition and Eurosceptic parties on Europe more than governing and Europhile parties, the article shows that Eurosceptic parties, by assuming government office, tend to lose their electoral advantage on EU issues, not only as compared to Europhile parties, but also to Eurosceptic parties remaining in opposition. In contrast, governing/opposition status does not condition the electoral potential of Europhile parties on the EU dimension.

Not for ideology but opportunity? The foundations of EU issue-voting in Eurosceptic Italy