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Throughout history, truce-making has been an important mechanism to temporarily halt fighting between antagonistic forces. In some instances, national truces are used to usher in longer-term national reconciliation. In this regard, there is an important analytical distinction between a truce and a reconciliation. What is sometimes articulated publicly as a formal reconciliation is often merely a truce, at least from the perspective of the hegemonic party. Drawing on the theoretical work of Nir Eisikovits, we develop this argument in relation to what we identify as the three official episodes of state-centric national reconciliation in Zimbabwe, all taking place under Mugabe’s rule. In doing so, we demonstrate how ZANU-PF recalibrated the reconciliations as truces to pursue its strategic power interests. In this context, and more briefly, we analyse the post-coup Mnangagwa government’s discourse and acts of reconciliation (existing outside an official reconciliation pact) as another episode of truce-making, designed to benchmark what is unacceptable oppositional politics.

Truce and reconciliation in Zimbabwe: from Mugabe to Mnangagwa Trêve et réconciliation au Zimbabwé : de Mugabe à Mnangagwa