English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

India’s governments since 2011 have rhetorically described a new and ambitious role for the navy as a ‘net security provider’ primarily to island and littoral states of the Indian Ocean. This was primarily based on the navy’s tasks as the ‘first responder’ for maritime disasters and enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness. Yet, the navy preferred instead to be seen in a less expansive role as a ‘provider of net maritime security.’ In late 2020, the navy further adapted this role to become a ‘preferred security partner’ for the littoral and island states of the Indian Ocean. This was essentially the result of budget constraints and capacity shortfalls. But, it also wisely signalled India’s more inclusive and minilateral/multilateral approach towards maritime security cooperation in the aftermath of its border clash with China in June 2020 and China's growing presence, influence and impact in the Indian Ocean region.

From ‘net security provider’ to ‘preferred security partnerships’: the rhetoric, reality and result of India’s maritime security cooperation