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In the wider context of the Cold War in the 1980s, a rare exception was a proposal for the potential co-hosting of the 1988 Summer Olympics between Seoul (South Korea) and Pyongyang (North Korea). While diplomatic exchanges between the two countries in other areas had produced inconclusive results, a series of joint meetings were organised by the International Olympic Committee to facilitate North Korean participation in the Games while preventing any action that might undermine the Games’ organisation. This historical analysis of these tripartite meetings aims to reconsider the frequently essentialist position of North Korea as a ‘Games saboteur’. While the talks ultimately proved to be a failure, they did have an effect on sports diplomacy. The threat of a massive boycott by the socialist countries, which did not occur in the end, and the progress of the negotiations show that there can be compromises to the host city principle enshrined in the IOC Olympic Charter.

The failure to co-host the Seoul 1988 Summer Olympics: a diplomacy “of small steps” influenced by international opinion (1985–88)