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This paper is aimed at explaining why Russia, despite its previous foreign policy course on the reverse, proceeded to recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008. It put itself at odds with its long-established foreign policy of non-recognition of secessionist entities in the post-Soviet space and primacy of territorial sovereignty in international relations. The paper argues that the recognition was not a necessary component of Russia’s military intervention, and was, as such, a serious deviation in its foreign policy, the sources of which are sought to be explained. It examines three explanations, and argues that the shift was to a lesser extent related to the recognition of Kosovo by the West, rather than the critical deterioration in the bilateral relations between Russia and Georgia, and a situation of affect that acted as the final trigger. It also argues that the military intervention and the recognition are both important for understanding the subsequent paradigm shift in Russian foreign policy that only came during the Crimea crisis.

Explaining Foreign Policy Deviations: The Strategic Rationale of Russia’s Recognition of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s Independence