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This study focuses on the endogenous choice between price and quantity contracts in a duopoly composed of asymmetric firms that care about corporate social responsibility (CSR) with managerial delegation. We find that the optimal strategy of a firm that cares about social welfare does not depend on both the degree of homogeneity of goods and the degrees of importance of CSR, while the that of one that cares about consumer surplus strictly depends on the degree on importance of CSR within its rival firm.

Corporate social responsibility and endogenous competition structure in an industry composed of asymmetric firms with managerial delegation