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Using data on Chinese A-share listed companies, this paper explores the interactive effects of managerial power and executive compensation incentives on corporate R&amp;D investments. We find that higher executive monetary compensation and perquisite consumption help increase corporate R&amp;D investments, while a large compensation gap within the management team can inhibit corporate R&amp;D investments. We further show that managerial power has different moderating effects on the relation between management incentives and corporate R&amp;D investments. Managerial power weakens the positive effects of explicit and implicit incentives of executives on corporate R&amp;D investments, while it strengthens the negative effect of the compensation gap within the management team on corporate R&amp;D investments.

Executive Compensation Incentives and Corporate R&D Investments: An Analysis Based on the Moderating Effect of Managerial Power