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The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is engaged in active combat operations against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, but the latter remains very resilient and continues to launch lethal attacks. Yet, scholarship has failed to examine the institutional circumstances that account for the lack of success by the MNJTF. This article explores the influence of the counterinsurgency frameworks of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU), Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) on the operations of the MNJTF. It takes a critical look at how the MNJTF’s states’ affiliation to separate sub-regional blocs influences military and intelligence cooperation among them. The article argues that the AU, ECOWAS, and ECCAS institutional counterinsurgency frameworks severely limit military and intelligence collaboration among its member nations, therefore impeding the MNJTF’s operations.

Institutional counterinsurgency frameworks in the Lake Chad Basin: the case of the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram