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Matthew Braddock’s argument from false god beliefs (AFG) is one of the most significant debunking arguments to emerge from the growing literature on Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). This argument aims to produce a defeater for any basic theistic belief. In this essay, I reply to AFG by defending a counter-example to AFG’s crucial premise. In particular, I argue that the cognitive mechanisms posited by CSR do not “significantly contribute” to perceptually based theistic belief formation in the way that AFG claims. As a result, a large class of basic theistic beliefs remains undefeated in the face of AFG.

Cognitive Science of Religion, Reliability, and Perceiving God