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The Whitlam Government’s decision in 1973 to withdraw Australian forces from Malaysia and Singapore has been regarded by some researchers as an act of disengagement with devastating effects for Australia’s regional engagement. However, a closer examination of the design of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) framework and a comparison between Whitlam’s and John Gorton’s positions on the defence of Southeast Asia indicate a realistic, bipartisan approach in Australia. The fact that Whitlam could withdraw Australian military forces from Malaysia and Singapore with relatively little resistance and minimal regional impact was largely due to Gorton’s strategic calculation during the FPDA’s negotiation. At the fundamental strategic level, the evolving Australian approach to the FPDA from Gorton to Whitlam was more a continuity than a rupture.

Rupture or continuity? The evolving Australian approach to the Five Power Defence Arrangements from Gorton to Whitlam