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Terrorist group rivalries have become widely studied since Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda-loyal groups began clashing in Syria. While existing literature finds such rivalries increase terrorist groups’ lethality and longevity, there are few case studies of IS provinces and al-Qaeda affiliates operating in the same geographic area outside the Middle East. One such province-affiliate rivalry that has only recently begun to be explored is between Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in the Sahel. This article utilises various primary sources, including group members’ interviews and written statements, to trace the ISGS-JNIM rivalry’s roots to their common Sahel-based predecessor, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (English: MUJWA; French: MUJAO) and finds literature has under-estimated MUJWA’s split from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) on ISGS’s emergence and inheriting a trafficking and non-scholarly legacy that merged with IS’s uncompromising strategic culture. Building on terrorism studies literature concerning rebel rivalries globally and Sahel-based area studies literature concerning intra-communal tensions, ethno-nationalism, and jihadism, the article argues that despite ISGS’s aspirations to supersede JNIM, the latter’s approach, which reflects AQIM theologians’ restraint and al-Qaeda’s coalition-building, will enable JNIM to become a fixture in the Sahel for the  longue durée . Furthermore, the article demonstrates how local conditions and international alliances affected ISGS and JNIM’s conduct of their insurgencies and dialogue with both each other and state actors.

Rebel rivals: reinterrogating the movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa and the roots of Al-Qaeda-Islamic State Infighting in the Sahel