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This study analyzes the power source of Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) leaders by sorting out the unique selection and appointment mechanism of SOE cadres in China and the organizational structure behind this mechanism. Empirical research finds when local core officials are investigated for corruption, it has a major impact on the top leaders of local SOEs due to ‘top to bottom’ personnel changes, which would in turn have a strong impact on corporate investment behavior. However, the magnitude of such impact would differ between local versus central SOEs, as well as among commercial competition versus public welfare SOEs. This study provides an analytical framework for Western scholars to study corporate governance of SOEs in China.

The power source of Chinese state-owned enterprise leaders, investigation of local core officials, and corporate investment behavior