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Although United Nations peacekeeping operations (UN PKOs) produce positive outcomes for peace, some missions are strategically replaced by cheaper and smaller UN political missions (PMs). This article explores why certain peacekeepers are replaced by UN PMs and unpacks the exit strategy of UN PKOs. The logic of demand-side and supply-side perspectives is evaluated using data on the deployment of UN peacekeepers and UN PMs in post-civil war countries between 1993 and 2016. Signing comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) increases the chances of UN PKOs being replaced by UN PMs because as the willingness to develop politically increases, the demand for civilian personnel after demilitarization also rises. On the supply side, as the preferences of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council concerning target states become more heterogenous, UN PKOs are more likely to be replaced by UN PMs because coordination problems encourage members to choose less burdensome missions.

Strategic Deployment of UN Political Missions to Replace UN Peacekeeping Operations: The Demand and Supply Sides of Transition Logic