English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

This paper draws on recently declassified papers in Israel, the United States and Britain to reveal the deep divisions between Israel and the United States over Saudi Crown Prince Fahd’s peace plan of August 1981. The United States perceived the seventh clause of the Fahd plan as a significant step forward because it implied that the Saudis could recognize Israel under certain conditions, yet Israel forcefully rejected the plan. The Begin government was concerned that the Reagan administration’s growing support for the Fahd plan presaged US abandonment of the Camp David process. Moreover, the tensions on this issue were significant since Israel feared that Washington would pursue closer strategic ties with the Saudis at the expense of its own special relationship with the United States. The Fahd initiative encouraged the Reagan administration in its aspiration to bring the Saudis into the Middle East peace process. The Begin government manipulated and misled the Israeli public in its insistence that the Saudis were seeking Israel’s destruction, when Riyadh appeared to be signalling its readiness to open a new chapter with the Jewish State. An early opportunity for potential cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia was therefore wasted.

Israel, the United States, Saudi Arabia and the Fahd Plan of 1981: an historic missed opportunity