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As Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father Hafez in 2000, a new ‘state bourgeoisie’ was created in Syria through means of liberalization and neopatrimonial approaches. In addition to the Alawites who are directly related to al-Assad, this new bourgeoisie included Sunnis and Christians who have proved their utmost loyalty to al-Assad. When the conflict started in 2011, many expected the Sunni businesspeople to join the opposition and distance themselves from al-Assad regime. However, and with the exception of three cases which are discussed in the article; this did not happen. Throughout this article I try to explain how the behavior of the business elite has contributed to the survival of al-Assad regime and the longevity of the conflict. To do so, I discuss the various strategies adopted by the business elite to support the regime while also analyzing the various co-optation and oppression tools that the regime used to subdue and mobilize the business elite. By studying these tools and methods, which rely on a mix of class and neopatrimonial methods, I conclude this article by offering another perspective and a different understanding of authoritarian regimes and their structure while assessing the robustness of these regimes and forecasting their methods in case of uprisings.

The role of the Syrian business elite in the Syrian conflict: a class narrative