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In over seven decades of existence, the Soviet intelligence community developed a theoretical concept of culminating secret operations based on the principles of the great European military theorists Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine de Jomini. Guided by that concept, from the 1960s onward, the community’s planners and operators strove to avoid the dangerous effect of culminating and subsequently collapsing intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities. Concurrently, many resources were spent on creating and exacerbating such destructive culmination in the operations of the adversaries. Non-Russian scholars dealing with Russian historical and intelligence studies have overlooked this phenomenon and its implications. The current article aims to fill that gap by drawing on new discoveries from recently declassified Soviet archives and a thorough re-reading of secondary sources. It discusses roots and patterns of the Russian concept of culmination in intelligence and counter-intelligence operations, distills an important lesson for non-Russian intelligence theorists and practitioners, and proposes avenues for future academic research in the field.

To Read Clausewitz in the KGB: Discovering the Russian Concept of Culmination in Intelligence Operations