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In an important subset of armed conflicts, there is a large disparity between the belligerents’ capabilities. Although the outcomes of such wars cannot be predicted with absolute certainty, the chances that a weak state will triumph are often so low that private information is not a satisfying explanation for conflict. Under which circumstances, then, does the disadvantaged side give in rather than attempting to fight? And what explains variation in effort levels by strong states? I present a model of an environment in which a strong state faces political pressure to replace the losing government following a costly war. I show that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the effort the winning state devotes to the war and the probability that the losing state surrenders – when war effort is low, the weaker state fights because it has a decent chance of winning; when it is high, the weak state fights because it recognizes that it will be replaced upon surrender. Further results are derived to explain the domestic political foundations of variation in strong states’ investments in lopsided conflicts. The results help rationalize a number of historical instances of lopsided conflict.

Futile or Farsighted? Domestic Politics, Leader Replacement, and the Nature of Lopsided Conflicts