English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

The conventional approach to examining firm-to-firm governance is unable to disentangle the complexity of strategies and the interplay between different actors with their corresponding rules and routines embedded within an institutional environment where the state plays as a key equity partner in joint ventures (JVs) in transitional economies. This paper proposes an analytical framework of hybrid governance to explain how an alignment of mutual interests between three groups of heterogeneous multi-scalar actors (states, local and foreign firms) facilitates technological upgrading in JVs and the establishment of local production networks in transitional economies. The case of Guangzhou Automobile Group (GAC) demonstrates how the divergent interests of various actors do not necessarily constrain the development of the JV. Under such hybrid governance, whereby the boundaries between public and private property are blurred, GAC’s senior managers have been able to navigate and align the multifaceted agendas of various actors: from the profit-maximization demanded by foreign JV partners and industrial development commanded by the central state, to the development of the local capacity and capability for large-scale production and product development and setting up local automotive supply chains required by the local state. Three necessary conditions for technological upgrading in JVs are identified: a 50-50 equity structure, a latecomer in a big market, and the financial imperative of local firm actors.

Hybrid governance of joint ventures in transitional economies: the case of Guangzhou Automobile Group in China