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The 1975 Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) marked a key period in the Northern Irish Troubles and provided an opportunity for peace to be reached more than 20 years before the Good Friday Agreement would be signed. Past commentaries have argued failure was the result of the PIRA being misled into the ceasefire by the British who falsified their true position, the PIRA leadership being too bound to ideology to appreciate the British negotiating position, and British forces outside of the Prime Minister’s Office creating the perception that the British were not prepared to negotiate. By using prospect theory as an explanation of the PIRA’s decision making, this article argues that the political wing of the organisation, i.e. Sinn Féin, was not developed enough to fully appreciate the political incentives the British Government was offering the PIRA in exchange for a permanent ceasefire.

Revising the 1975 PIRA ceasefire through the lens of prospect theory