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In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union tried to induce North Korea to drift away from China. This challenged China’s security, given escalated tension between China and the Soviet Union in this period. To counter the Soviet policies, China used binding strategies, which are a state’s attempt to maintain or enhance its alignment with its security partners. I argue that China chose coercive binding as its primary strategy because it had strong leverage over North Korea. Meanwhile, China deployed accommodative binding to complement its primary strategy. In this article, I first develop a theoretical framework to explain how a state chooses its binding strategies. I then apply this theory to the Chinese-North Korean-Soviet triangle in the late 1960s. I conclude by discussing broader theoretical and policy implications, such as the importance of examining how states mix different types of binding strategies.

Logic of Choice: China’s Binding Strategies toward North Korea, 1965–1970