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Until recently, leading work on the philosophy of thought experiments mistakenly credited Mach with coining the term. While Ørsted’s prior use has become more widely acknowledged, there remains a consensus that Mach is the true source of the  concept  as currently understood. I argue that Mach’s view has key features in common with Ørsted’s account. Features of thought experiment emphasized by both Ørsted and Mach include (1) its experimental method of variation, (2) scientific thought as an expression of human autonomy, (3) its potential to solve the problem of new knowledge in geometry, and (4) the importance of thought experiment for pedagogy. These similarities make it likely, as an inference to the best explanation, that Mach was familiar with Ørsted’s work. My research challenges recent assertions that Ørsted’s view had no detectable influence on the development of the concept of thought experiment; I also raise problems for the assumption that Mach’s view gained popularity because of its theoretical advantages over Ørsted’s. I conclude there is no justification for drawing a line across the history of the philosophy of thought experiments that includes Mach but excludes Ørsted.

Ørsted, Mach, and the history of ‘thought experiment’