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Most scholars writing on Arab-Israeli matters barely address the Egyptian-Israeli autonomy talks, and what has been written largely dismisses them as Egyptian and United States capitulation to Israeli expansion. But a focus on archival documents from the first months of the talks in 1979 demonstrates three points at odds with this conventional narrative. Whilst Egyptian negotiators were ultimately rebuffed, Egypt pushed for significant moves towards Palestinian national self-determination, especially in their proposal of 25 June 1979. Consistent with the Carter Administration’s mixed approach, the United States stood in a middle ground during these talks, sometimes siding with Egypt such as with the need for Palestinian representation and other times with Israel such as in discouraging political discussions. Lastly, by explicitly discussing which officials were at the table, we see the United States negotiating approach reinforces a notion from the mediation literature that sustained, high-level engagement is crucial if a mediating country hopes to achieve a breakthrough.

Egypt, Israel, and the United States at the Autonomy Talks, 1979