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An influential view in primate social cognition research is that chimpanzees, as well as other great apes, attribute the mental relation of seeing to others. In a recent article, Tyler Burge challenges this view and argues that data from studies with chimpanzees provide no evidence that chimpanzees attribute the mental relation of seeing but only that they attribute the nonmental relation of sensing. Burge’s argument rests upon the claim that attributions of seeing attribute more than attributions of sensing. We contend that the reasons Burge offers for this claim are unconvincing. We go on to argue that data from a recent study with chimpanzees cannot be explained on the hypothesis that chimpanzees attribute sensing but can be explained on the hypothesis that they attribute seeing. We conclude that, as things stand, there is currently more reason to take chimpanzees to attribute the mental relation of seeing than the nonmental relation of sensing.

Chimpanzees are mindreaders: On why they attribute seeing rather than sensing