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This article considers whether the Royal Navy’s 1913 manoeuvres gave the Navy any useful guidance on strategy or tactics for the forthcoming war. By looking at the reasoning behind earlier manoeuvres, the objectives of the 1913 manoeuvres, and comparing their conduct with wartime events, it is demonstrated that little was learned from these manoeuvres. Instead, their objective was political rather than military, intended to show the British Government that the Royal Navy should not be constrained to a defensive role protecting the coast from raids, a role that the Navy ascribed to the Army. Although the results confirmed that Britain was vulnerable to amphibious raids, the Navy would not change its stance, seeking to apply economic warfare against Germany and refusing to disperse the Fleet to cover the coastline. Splitting the fleet, the Admiralty believed, would have made it easier for the German Navy to destroy warships in local actions in their bid to achieve parity with the Royal Navy.

The Royal Navy’s manoeuvres of 1913: tactical exercise or political stratagem?