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The Fall of Saigon in April 1975 triggered an existential crisis in Philippine national security. Long dependent on the United States as the essential guarantor of Philippine security, events in Indochina forced Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos to question the wisdom of this arrangement. Shocked by the unwillingness of the American Congress to aid South Vietnam, Marcos became increasingly skeptical of American security assurances and demanded that U.S.–Philippine alliance be reviewed in order to better meet Philippine security needs. During the ensuing negotiations over the Military Base Agreement, Washington was forced to reckon with doubts over American resolve and new realities like Congress’s burgeoning influence in foreign affairs. While the Ford administration failed to overcome these challenges, the Carter administration proved more responsive to Philippine apprehensions. Ultimately, to reach an agreement the U.S. adopted new collaborative security practices and policies on the South China Sea that continue to underscore U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia today.

Reassurance and Revival the U.S.–Philippine Alliance in the Wake of the Vietnam War