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Sweden was one of the very few Western countries officially to recognize the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR in 1940 as lawful. While this naturally had a detrimental effect on the reputation of Sweden in Baltic liberation activist circles during the end stage of the Cold War, it also meant that Swedish diplomats did not have their hands tied to the same extent as those states that had not recognized the annexations. The first permanent Swedish ‘department office’ was already established in Tallinn in December 1989, and Swedish diplomats such as Lars Fredén and Dag Sebastian Ahlander could experience the rise of the Baltic liberation movement first-hand and at an early stage. This article focuses on Swedish diplomatic reporting from the emerging Baltic states and Russia in 1989–1991 as a source of the pro-Baltic policy shift in Swedish foreign policy, which challenged the dominant policy discourse in Sweden that prioritized appeasement of the USSR/Russia.

Baltic liberation first-hand: Sweden’s pro-Baltic foreign policy shift and Swedish diplomatic reporting in 1989–1991