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After the fall of the USSR, the newly established republics had to finish negotiating the bilateral border issue with China. These states chose to have the talks as a joint delegation of post-Soviet states. They also each experienced pressure from domestic constituencies. Viewing the entire negotiation process as a three-level game, the paper argues that in all four post-Soviet states the national governments believed the cost of ‘no agreement’ with China on the border issue to be so high that they chose to risk dealing with complex issues at home over passing up the opportunity to settle the border with their strongest neighbour. They did so with little regard for domestic opposition or the restrictions posed by the previous commitments on the supranational level.

Post-Soviet settlement of the Sino-Soviet border: a failed attempt at a three-level game, 1991–2012