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Hobbes’s account of the sovereign’s right to punish in  Leviathan  has led to a longstanding interpretive dispute. The debate is prompted by the fact that,  prima facie , Hobbes makes two inconsistent claims: subjects (i) authorize all the acts of the sovereign, and are hence authors of their own punishment, yet (ii) have the liberty to resist such punishment. I argue that attending to Hobbes’s surprisingly neglected account of power yields a novel interpretation of his theory of punishment. Hobbes, it turns out, is working with two conceptions of power:  potestas , a juridical power, and  potentia , a factual power. Each power grounds one of the ‘inconsistent’ claims above:  potestas  founds the authorized condemnation by the legal system, and  potentia  the factual enforced penalty, which is not directly authorized and can be resisted.

Hobbes on the power to punish