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This article applies Stephen Biddle’s “modern system” to naval war in the industrial era, c. 1860–1918. Biddle doubts his model’s transferability beyond continental/land warfare. A historical perspective suggests otherwise. Beginning in the 1860 s, navies—even earlier than armies—confronted industrial firepower and adapted accordingly. Submarines, torpedo boats, cruisers and eventually aircraft all relied on the “modern system” principles of cover and concealment, maneuver and combined arms to survive and perform useful missions. Today, concepts like “distributed lethality” have precedents in a “maritime modern system”—one undercurrent in naval history that is increasingly relevant.

Taking the “modern system” to sea: The past and future of naval power in industrial war