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This article explores deterrence as an element in cybersecurity strategy from a small state perspective. The cyber domain presents novel challenges for strategy makers, and applying deterrence in the cyber domain requires an organized and multinational approach – since few states can leverage deterrence in this all-encompassing domain on their own. Deterrence has been an important factor in shaping global security for half a century, but when applied to the cyber domain there are certain inherent mechanisms that must be understood in order to generate the desired effects. Key issues discussed are the  volume of agents capable of operating and creating effects  in the domain, and  the availability of tools and techniques . These issues concerning  actors  and  vectors  makes it difficult to survey threats and create targeted deterrence. Furthermore, the cyber milieu makes it  difficult to connect action to motives , thereby further complicating any attempt to analyze the actual importance of observable effects. From a strategist’s point of view, these general characteristics are exacerbated by the fact that  the international community does not have a common language or shared platform to uniformly approach these issues.  Absent clarity on some fundamentals the core issues of  attribution and proportionality  becomes a hindrance to effective deterrence.

Small players in a limitless domain: Cyber deterrence as small state strategy