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This paper aims at disentangling two distinct problems in present philosophy of logic: the  a priori/a posteriori  divide and the theory choice problem. A confusion of these problems is present in the heart of current anti-exceptionalism about logic, as the use of  a posteriori  methods is identified with theory choice. We illustrate how the division may be preserved in a version of anti-exceptionalism by discussing Carnap’s approach, which had both an  a priori  epistemology and a pragmatic account of logical theory choice. This contributes to illuminate the claim that the current understanding is mistaken in considering Carnap as an exceptionalist, and it also helps us to address one of the difficulties of current anti-exceptionalism, to know, that, by equating  a posteriori  with theory choice, it requires appeal to framework-independent facts. We suggest that the pragmatic account of both Quine and Carnap to theory choice was advanced precisely to avoid that kind of difficulty.

Carnapian Lessons for Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic