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In this article, Stockemer and Normandin test whether recent developments in the populist radical right’s messaging, such as the strategic introduction of gender equality in these parties’ political discourse and their evolution towards economic chauvinism, has changed women’s and men’s propensity to vote for the populist radical right. Using data from the eighth wave of the European Social Survey (ESS), the authors find that two traditional explanations for the gender gap in voting for the populist radical right have lost their explanatory power. First, their results indicate that the ideological moderation hypothesis no longer applies; that is, anti-immigration sentiment and a rightist ideology are currently as much of a reason to cast their ballot for the populist radical right for female voters as they are for male voters. Second, they no longer find support that economic dissatisfaction is a stronger driver for men than for women to vote for the populist radical right. Rather, their results indicate the contrary. In addition, they find that education is more of a bulwark against supporting the populist radical right for women. Finally, their results illustrate that older men are more likely to vote for the populist radical right than older women.

Men and women voters of the populist radical right: are they like apples and oranges?