Models inconsistent with altruism cannot explain the evolution of human cooperation
Author(s) -
Kristian Ove R. Myrseth,
Conny Wollbrant
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
proceedings of the national academy of sciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 5.011
H-Index - 771
eISSN - 1091-6490
pISSN - 0027-8424
DOI - 10.1073/pnas.1602463113
Subject(s) - deliberation , premise , intuition , altruism (biology) , evolutionary game theory , psychology , social psychology , game theory , computer science , cognitive science , epistemology , economics , microeconomics , political science , philosophy , politics , law
The article “Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation,” by Bear and Rand (1), uses game theoretic models to examine the role of intuition and deliberation in human cooperation. The premise is that dual processes characterize human social decision making: “(i) automatic, intuitive processes that are relatively effortless but inflexible; and (ii) controlled, deliberative processes that are relatively effortful but flexible” (1). The objective is to “provide a formal theoretical framework for considering the question of whether prosociality is intuitive or whether it requires self-control,” and the article concludes that “evolution never favors strategies for which deliberation increases cooperation” (1). However, …
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