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In order to identify the extent to which results from topological graphmodels are useful for modeling vulnerability in electricity infrastructure, wemeasure the susceptibility of power networks to random failures and directedattacks using three measures of vulnerability: characteristic path lengths,connectivity loss and blackout sizes. The first two are purely topologicalmetrics. The blackout size calculation results from a model of cascadingfailure in power networks. Testing the response of 40 areas within the EasternUS power grid and a standard IEEE test case to a variety of attack/failurevectors indicates that directed attacks result in larger failures using allthree vulnerability measures, but the attack vectors that appear to cause themost damage depend on the measure chosen. While our topological and power gridmodel results show some trends that are similar, there is only a mildcorrelation between the vulnerability measures for individual simulations. Weconclude that evaluating vulnerability in power networks using purelytopological metrics can be misleading.

Do topological models provide good information about vulnerability in electric power networks?