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This article analyzes co-regulation as a policy instrument that makes it possible to achieve synergy between public support and private efforts in the food sector. Our objective is to demonstrate the interest and the limits, as well as the conditions of the effectiveness of this instrument, through the analysis of the French voluntary agreements for nutritional improvements. We compared our interpretation of the French model for political action on the nutritional quality of the food offer to the results of our assessment of the agreements. We observed a gap between the political aspirations declared, the model designed and the actually trajectory that was followed: this public intervention is a response to the seriousness of the problem but not to its urgency. This analysis deals with two key dimensions of the modification of the offer by voluntary commitments: the intrinsic quality of the commitments and the part of the overall offer covered by these commitments. Should we attempt to minimally improve a large part of the offer or, instead, to try to obtain a radical improvement that may only involve a small part of it? We attempt here to provide new insights into this question.

Efficiency of public-private co-regulation in the food sector: the French voluntary agreements for nutritional improvements