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The property right of small water conservancy projects (hereinafter referred to as SWCP) currently can be defined as three different forms: public property rights, private property rights, and a combination of public and private property rights. The main participants are the government, farmers, and other organizations. The interests and demands of different subjects are different, so the property rights structure of the SWCPs are also different. In order to explore the evolutionary law of the property right structure of SWCPs in the case of conflicting demands of multiple stakeholders, a game model for the evolutionary law of each main body of SWCPs was proposed in this paper. By analyzing the feasibility of the game of multi-stakeholder appeal conflicts, a multi-stakeholder game model was established. The game and evolution of each stakeholder were analyzed, and the evolution of the property rights of SWCPs under the game of each subject was simulated and analyzed. The research results show that if the incentives and constraints of cooperation between farmers and cooperatives, associations and other organizations are greater than the cost of cooperation, farmers will participate in the cooperation and invest in elements actively, thus promoting the integration of elements, thereby contributing resource complementarity among participants and leaving more cooperation surplus. If the benefits of cooperation between the government and farmer organizations plus the total benefits of the incentive and restraint mechanism are greater than the total cost of active cooperation, furthermore, the incremental benefits of the incentive and restraint mechanism are not lower than the incremental costs of participating in the cooperative, then, farmer organizations are easier to get succeed. The research results have certain reference significance for the option of the property rights and management modes of SWCPs.

Game Research on Property Right Evolution of Small Water Conservancy Projects under the Conflict of Multi-Stakeholders